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LEGISLATION
Bail Reform in the State and Federal Systems
I. BAIL IN ENGLAND
The origin of the institution of bail is not entirely known, but it is
believed to have originated in medieval England as a device to free
untried prisoners. The definitive structure of the process seems to
have been first codified in 1275 in the Statute of Westminster. The
institution developed gradually and eventually became so well es-
tablished that the English Bill of Rights of 1688 provided that "ex-
cessive bail ought not to be required."' The factors contributing to
the development of the institution of bail were primarily matters of
practical importance. Disease-ridden jails, delayed trials by traveling
justices, and insecure prisons led the ancient sheriffs, into whose cus-
tody the accused was given, to allow the accused to be "bailed" to
his friends or family. The "bailment" was conditioned upon the
promise of the third party that the accused would be present on the
trial date. If the defendant escaped, the third party surety was re-
quired to surrender himself to the court in place of the accused.
With the passage of time, sureties, who were usually required to be
land owners, were permitted to forfeit promised sums of money or
real estate instead of themselves in the event the accused failed to
appear for trial. The benefits resulting from this ancient practice
were twofold: first, the accused was allowed personal freedom until
found guilty of a crime; and second, the state was saved the expense
incident to incarceration. 2 The relationship between the accused and
his surety remains a personal one in England today. Yet the discre-
tionary manner in which the English courts consider the institution
of bail permits denial of bail in cases where the magistrate believes
that the defendant is likely to tamper with the evidence or commit
new offenses if released.3
II. BArIm A.MFmCA
A. Early History
With some modification, the English concept of bail has been ac-
cepted in America. The United States Constitution does not expressly
provide for a right to bail, for the eighth amendment states only that
"excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor
1. Bill of Rights, 1688, W. & M. 2, c. 2, § 2(10).
2. 2 POLLOCK & MAIrLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw B FORE Ti TimE, OF
EDwARD I 584-90 (2d ed. 1898).
3. FREED & WALD, BAM IN THE UNITED STATES: 1964, 2 (1964).
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cruel and unusual punishment inflicted." Yet bail was unequivocally
set forth as a matter of right in non-capital criminal cases by the
Judiciary Act of 1789. Since the eighth amendment was not ratified
until 1791, the Judiciary Act of 1789 was actually passed by Congress
before the eighth amendment, although both were enacted by the
same session.4 This absolute right, recognized by the Judiciary Act
of 1789, is continued today in the form of Rule 46 of the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure.5 In the leading case of Stack v. Boyle,6 Justice
Jackson stated that: "From the passage of the Judiciary Act of 1789
S.. to the present Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure .. .federal
law has unequivocally provided that a person arrested for a non-
capital offense shall be admitted to bail." Whether or not the eighth
amendment, by implication, guarantees the right to bail in non-capital
cases is a matter of speculation. The modem view, as illustrated by
the recent case of Trimble v. Stone,7 seems to be that the "excessive
bail" clause of the eighth amendment guarantees, by implication, the
right to bail.8 The dispute is of little significance, however, for all but
seven states have guaranteed the right to bail in non-capital cases in
either state constitutions or by statute9
The purpose of the bail system in America "is to insure the presence
of the accused when required without the hardship of incarceration
before guilt has been proved and while the presumption of innocence
is to be given effect."10 American courts have repudiated the doctrine
of preventive detention as contrary to our system of law. As Mr..
Justice Jackson pointed out in Williamson v. United States:"'
Imprisonment to protect society from predicted but unconsummated offenses
is so unprecedented in this country and so fraught with danger of excesses
and injustice that I am loathe to resort to it, even as a discretionary judicial
technique to supplement conviction of such offenses as those of which de-
fendants stand convicted.12
Bail in America should serve one function-to release the accused
with assurance that he will return at trial.
13
4. Comment, Constitutional Law-Right to Bail, 51 MIH. L. RFv. 389 (1953).
5. FED. R. CimM. P. 46.
6. 342 U.S. 1, 4 (1951).
7. 187 F. Supp. 483 (D.D.C. 1960).
8. Paulsen, Pre-Trial Release in the United States, 66 CoLuM. L. REv. 109 (1966).
Professor Paulsen points out that the eighth amendment may come within the realm
of those provisions of the Bill of Rights which have been incorporated into the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment and applied as a restriction on state action.
9. For an extensive listing of the states which provide a right to bail by either
constitutional provision or by statute, see FREED & WALD, op. cit. supra note 3, at 2 n.8.
10. United States ex rel. Rubinstein v. Mulcahy, 155 F.2d 1002, 1004 (2d Cir. 1946).
11. 184 F.2d 280 (2d Cir. 1950).
12. Id. at 282-83.
13. FREED &WALD, op. cit. supra note 3, at 8.
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B. The Commercial Bondsman
The purpose of bail, however, has been distorted in America by the
appearance of the commercial bondsman. The close personal relation-
ship between the surety and the accused which existed in England
proved to be suitable for the immobile, land-oriented population of
the feudal age. In the United States, on the other hand, practical
factors gradually required the system to evolve into an impersonal
relationship based upon the promise of monetary forfeiture if the ac-
cused person failed to appear for trial. This impersonal relationship
between the surety and the accused foreshadowed the appearance
of the professional bondsman.14 It has been suggested that com-
mercial bondsmen emerged in this country to meet the needs of ac-
cused persons whose right to bail would otherwise be thwarted by
the lack of a personal surety, real estate or adequate cash.15 Al-
though the bail bondsman system in America possibly serves this
purpose, it has been challenged as undermining the whole purpose
of bail. The concurring opinion in the recent case of Pannell v. United
States' 6 pointed out that the accused's eligibility for release and the
amount of the accused's bond may not be intimately related.'" Judge
Brazelon, concurring and dissenting, stated that such an assumption
presupposes that an appellant with higher bail has a more substantial
stake and therefore a greater incentive not to flee.' While this may be
true if no professional bondsman is involved, Judge Bazelon continued,
when a bondsman is involved it is he and not the court who determines
the appellants real stake. It is the bondsman who ordinarily makes the
decision whether or not to require collateral for the bond, and if he
does, then appellants stake may be related to the amount of the
bond. But if he does not, Judge Bazelon concluded, "then appellant
has no real financial stake in complying with the conditions of the
bond, regardless of the amount, since the fee paid for the bond is
not refundable under any circumstances. Hence, the court does not
decide-or even know-whether a higher bond for a particular ap-
plicant means that he has a greater stake."19 Thus, in the American
system of bail, a frankly monetary condition is imposed on release
pending trial. While the forfeiture of money may be adequate in-
surance that the accused will appear for trial, it is quite obvious that
this necessarily discriminates against those who have little or no money.
14. Comment, The Administration of Bail and Pretrial Freedom in Texas, 43 TXAs
L. REv. 356, 357 (1965).
15. FREED & WALD, op. cit. supra note 3, at 22.
16. 320 F.2d 698, 699 (D.C. Cir. 1963) (Wright, J., concurring).
17. Ibid.
18. 320 F.2d at 701.
19. 320 F.2d at 702.
E VoL. 20
LEGISLATION
As former Attorney General Robert Kennedy pointed out in a recent
article, numerous studies indicate that there is little, if any, relation-
ship between appearance at trial and ability to post bail.20
C. Constitutional Problems
The courts, when faced with an indigent defendant who obviously
would find it difficult to secure a bond in any amount, have the difficult
problem of determining by the constitutional standard of the eighth
amendment in what amount bail would not be excessive.21 There is
some indication in an early federal court case that the court was
keenly aware of this problem, but thus far the courts have failed to
formulate a reasonable test for the "excessive bail" provision of the
eighth amendment. Rather, the courts have sought to follow objective
standards such as the suitability of the amount as proportionate to the
offense charged,2 which fail to reach and deal with the crucial ques-
tion of whether the bail is excessive as to the instant defendant. In
recent years, however, the Supreme Court has challenged the validity
of requiring financial bail from an impoverished defendant. Mr. Justice
Douglas pointed out that considerable problems for the equal adminis-
tration of the law are raised by continuing to demand a substantial
bond which the indigent defendant is unable to secure: "Can an
indigent be denied freedom, where a wealthy man would not, because
he does not happen to have enough property to pledge for his free-
dom?"24 Thus, there appears to be some authority indicating that bail
must be tailored to the individual defendant, and if the bail is held
to be excessive, it may be found to deny the individual of a consti-
tutional right.
D. Present Problems
The present system of bail is contrary to two of the most funda-
mental beliefs of our system of law: first, that there is equality of
all men before the law; and second, that there is a presumption of
innocence until one is proven guilty. One authority has stated that:
"As many of those accused of crime are indigent or have very limited
financial resources.., there is implicit in the requirement of financial
security a factor of economic and class discrimination which is difficult
20. Kennedy, Criminal Justice, 5 Wm. & MARY L. REv. 167, 170 (1964).
21. Foote, The Coming Constitutional Crisis in Bail, 113 U. PA. L. REv. 959, 992
(1965).
22. United States v. Lawrence, 26 Fed. Cas. 887 (No. 15576) (C.C.D.C. 1835).
23. Foote, A Study of the Administration of Bail in New York City, 106 U. PA. L.
1Ev. 693, 696 (1958).
24. Bandy v. United States, 81 Sup. Ct. 197-98 (1960).
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to reconcile with the goal of equal justice."2 Many arrested persons,
unable to provide bail, spend relatively long periods of time in jails
or in similar detention awaiting trial. A substantial number of these
are never convicted. While the system of bail discriminates against
the poor in favor of the wealthy, not all that is wrong with bail results
from the system itself. In many instances discrimination in bail pro-
cedures results from the practice of those who administer the system.
In a study of the bail system in Chicago initiated in 1927, it was found
that bail setting followed an arbitrary schedule geared to the alleged
offense. The committing magistrates seldom considered any individ-
ual aspects of the case.2 6 A study of the bail system in New York in
1957 revealed essentially the same unfortunate pattern. This system
has been severely criticized for failing to consider the character of the
individual defendant and his financial ability to give bail and for plac-
ing an inordinate degree of importance on the nature of the offense.
27
While many magistrates are not aware of the unjust result which is
obtained from these bail practices, there is some indication that bail
has been, and is being consciously used for improper reasons. Some
magistrates have admitted that they set bail unreasonably high to
"break" crime waves, keep the defendant in jail, cut him off from his
narcotics supply, protect women, make an example of a particularly
abusive defendant, make him "serve some time" even when acquittal
was a certainty, or protect arresting officers from false arrest suits.
Thus, in many instances the purpose of the bail system in America-
to release the accused with assurance that he will return for trial-
has been distorted, if not completely lost.
The effects of misapplication of the bail system can be far reaching.
Beely, in describing the bail system of Chicago, stated that police
lockups, where arrested persons were jailed pending bail determina-
tions, were places where "a person with any decency would feel that
one night there defiled him for life."29 Former Attorney General Rob-
ert Kennedy has pointed out that the present bail system dramatically
affects young adults accused of crime. Since many of them lack the
25. Foote, The Bail System and Equal Justice, 23 Fed. Prob. 43 (1959).
26. BEELEY, TiH BAn. SYSTEm rN CHICAGO 59-68 (1927).
27. Foote, supra note 23. A similar study of Philadelphia made in 1954 revealed
that committing magistrates in that city only considered police evidence in the ma-
jority of the cases before setting bail. See Comment, Compelling Appearance in
Court: Administration of Bail in Philadelphia, 102 U. PA. L. REv. 1031 (1954). Bail
practices in federal courts were carefully reviewed in 1963. It was found that
practically the only facts considered in initial bail decisions by United States Com-
missioners were the charge against the defendant and the circumstances of the al-
leged offense, as communicated by the prosecuting attorney. See FnEED & WALD, op.
cit. supra note 3, at 17.
28. Foote, supra note 25, at 46-47.
29. BEELEY, op. cit. supra note 26, at 42.
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money to buy a bail bond, the resulting pre-trial imprisonment often
throws them into the company of hardened criminals. "This time in
jail-prior to trial-is equivalent, in the words of Justice Douglas, 'to
an M.A. degree in crime."' 30 Since a defendant who cannot post bail
must stay in jail until his trial, it is generally agreed that the jailed
defendant will be convicted more readily than the defendant who
has been able to post bond. It is more difficult for a jailed defendant
to assist in the preparation of a proper defense, for he cannot con-
tribute to the location of witnesses or to the finding of exculpatory
evidence. Interviews with the defense counsel are less easily arranged
and can only be for limited periods of time. For the jailed defendant
who is a daily wage-earner, detention renders him unable to earn the
money needed to hire an attorney to represent him; and by the time
he is tried and acquitted, he will have lost his job. Another disad-
vantage which the jailed defendant suffers is the impression which
he makes on the jury when he enters the courtroom for trial. He
enters the courtroom through the door leading from the lockup in
the company of an officer, and it is thought that this unduly prejudices
the defendant in the minds of the jury.31 In a Philadelphia survey
limited to certain serious crimes, 48 per cent of bailed defendants
were acquitted compared with 18 per cent of jailed defendants. In a
similar New York survey, the grand jury dismissed 24 per cent of the
bail cases and 10 per cent of the jail cases.m Not only does the ac-
cused suffer from pre-trial detention, but his family suffers as well.
If he is a daily wage-earner, and most probably he will be, his family
must find some means of subsistence until the defendant is tried.
Yet millions of dollars are spent each year for the pre-trial detention
of accused persons who will eventually be acquitted. Federal de-
tainees spent an estimated 600,000 jail days in prison in 1963, at a
cost to the federal government of 2 million dollars.3 In 1962, 58,458
persons spent an average of 30 days in pre-trial detention in New
York City, at a cost to the city of 6.25 dollars per day, or over 10
million dollars per year.m When most penal institutions are inade-
30. Kennedy, supra note 20, at 171.
31. Paulsen, supra note 8, at 113.
32. Foote, supra note 25, at 47. "More striking and probably more significant are
the contrasts in disposition of guilty cases. In Philadelphia 59 per cent of the jail
cases but only 22 per cent of the bail cases were sentenced to imprisonment, while
in New York 84 per cent of the jail and only 45 per cent of the bail cases were
sentenced to a penal institution." Ibid.
33. Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights and the Subcom-
mittee on Improvements in Judiciary Machinery of the Senate Committee on the





quately equipped to handle the number of convicted individuals, pre-
trial detention aggravates an otherwise bad situation. Pre-trial deten-
tion results in both the useless wastage of millions of dollars and an
even greater wastage of human resources.
III. BAIL RFoi_ m Acr or 1966
In 1961 Attorney General Robert Kennedy stated: "I have a strong
feeling that the law, especially in criminal cases, favors the rich man
over the poor in such matters as bail, the cost of defense counsel, the
cost of appeals and so on. We have appointed a study group to see
what can be done to make the law more equitable in this respect. 13 5
Thus, in 1963, the bail practices in federal courts were carefully re-
viewed in the Report of the Attorney Generars Committee on Poverty
and the Administration of Federal Criminal Justice. The Committee
disclosed that many of the abuses of the bail system described above
existed in the federal court system.36 The efforts of the Vera Founda-
tion of New York City, the United States Department of Justice, and
certain members of Congress in awakening the public to the need of
reform in the American bail system,3" at least in the federal courts,
resulted in the Bail Reform Act of 1966.31 Signed by the President on
June 22, 1966, the Bail Reform Act was enacted "to revise the practices
relating to bail to assure that all persons, regardless of their financial
status, shall not needlessly be detained pending their appearance to
answer charges, to testify, or pending appeal, when detention serves
neither the ends of justice nor the public interest."39 The Bail Reform
Act is a major development in the field of criminal justice, for it goes
far towards eliminating "bail" from the "glossary of criminal pro-
cedure." Under the new act, pre-trial release no longer depends upon
the individual's wealth. As President Johnson said upon signing the
bill:
Because of the bail system, the scales of justice have been weighted for
almost two centuries not with fact, nor law, nor mercy. They have been
weighted with money.
But now, because of the Bail Reform Act of 1966 which Congress has
enacted and which I sign today, we can begin to insure that defendants
are considered as individuals, not as dollar signs. 40
35. Quoted in Ares & Sturz, Bail and the Indigent Accused, 8 Crime & Delinquency
12, 15 (1962).
36. 1964 Senate Hearings at 211-21.
37. McCree, Keynote Address: Bail and the Indigent Defendant, 1965 U. ILL. L.F. 1.
38. 80 Stat. 214 (1966).
39. Bail Reform Act of 1966, 80 Stat. 214 (1966).
40. NAnoNAL CONFERENCE ON BArL AND CRmuNAL JusTICE, BAiL AND SUMMONS:
1965, at xxi (1966).
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The Bail Reform Act creates a presumption of release before trial
without the payment of money. If the United States Commissioner
or district judge determines that the defendant's written promise to
return for trial is not sufficient to guarantee his return, he must im-
pose additional conditions of release.4' In shaping release conditions
appropriate to risk, the act requires judicial officers to consider the
accused's family, employment and community ties, in addition to the
accused's criminal record and history of nonappearance at trial. Since
the act seeks to discourage bail bonds, criminal prosecutions take the
place of bail bond forfeitures as the primary sanction against defen-
dants who flee.42 If the defendant cannot meet the conditions imposed
by the act, he is entitled, after twenty-four hours, to a review of de-
tention by the commissioner who imposed the conditions.43  If the
commissioner does not amend his order, he must set forth in writing
his reasons for requiring the imposed conditions. The defendant may
then move the district court to amend the order and have his motion
promptly determined. If his motion is denied, the defendant is en-
titled to an expedited appeal. Although the Bail Reform Act goes
far toward eliminating "money bail," it does not completely do away
with it.44 One of the conditions which may be imposed is an appearance
bond; but instead of requiring the defendant to purchase a bond from
a commercial bondsman for a non-refundable fee, the Bail Reform
Act requires the defendant to deposit with the court ten per cent of
the amount of the bond, "such deposit to be returned upon the per-
formance of the conditions of release."45 In essence, the act seeks to
return to the concept of bail its true meaning-to release the accused
with assurance that he will return for trial.
41. In the event that the judicial officer finds that release on personal recognizance
is not sufficient to guarantee the defendant's return for trial, the officer must impose
the first of the following conditions which he considers adequate, or a combination of
any two or more if no single condition is sufficient: "(1) place the person in the
custody of a designated person or organization agreeing to supervise him; (2) place
restrictions on the travel, association, or place of abode of the person during the period
of release; (3) require the execution of an appearance bond in a specified amount
and the deposit in the registry of the court, in cash or other security as directed, of a
sum not to exceed 10 per centum of the amount of the bond, such deposit to be
returned upon the performance of the conditions of release; (4) require the execution
of a bail bond with sufficient solvent sureties, or the deposit of cash in lieu thereof;
or (5) impose any other condition deemed reasonably necessary to assure appearance
as required, including a condition requiring that the person return to custody after
specified hours." 80 Stat. 214 (1966).
42. Hearings Before the Subcommittee of the House Committee on the Judiciary,
89th Cong., 1st Sess., at 40-41 (1966) [hereinafter cited as 1966 House Hearings].
43. H.R. REP. No. 1541, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1966).
44. Wald & Freed, The Bail Reform Act of 1966: A Practitioner's Primer, 52 A.B.A.J.
940-42 (1966).
45. Bail Reform Act of 1966, 80 Stat. 214 (1966).
1967 ]
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
Within a few days following the signing of the Bail Reform Act,
the President signed the District of Columbia Bail Agency Act.40
The purpose of this act was to create a permanent bail agency to take
over the work of the Washington, D.C., Bail Project which expired in
September, 1966. The agency will collect the information needed by
United States Commissioners and district judges to determine whether
accused individuals should be released pending trial on his personal
recognizance. Closely akin to the previous two acts, on February 28,
1966, the Supreme Court adopted new amendments to Rule 46 of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. The new amendments empha-
size a policy against unnecessary detention of defendants pending
trial, and provide that "the attorney for the government shall make
a bi-weekly report to the court listing each defendant and witness who
has been held in custody pending indictment, arraignment or trial for
a period in excess of ten days .... As to each defendant so listed the
attorney for the government shall make a statement of the reasons
why the defendant is still held in custody." 47
IV. M iwi-r BAIL PRoJECT
The reform movement which has swept the federal court system has
not completely bypassed the courts of the various states. In 1961 the
Vera Foundation, in cooperation with New York University Law
School, launched the Manhattan Bail Project. The Bail Project was
essentially an experiment with the increased use of release on re-
cognizance as an alternative to bail. The project clearly demonstrated
that judges were more willing to release accused persons on their own
recognizance when presented with verified information about their
family ties, residence, and employment, than without such informa-
tion.4 Possibly of more importance, it also clearly demonstrated that
defendants with community ties would nearly always return to court
at the appointed time, whether or not bail had been posted. The
Manhattan Bail Project not only led to the establishment of a perma-
nent pre-trial release operation in New York City, but it also has served
as the model for similar projects in close to 100 communities in over
half the states of the United States.49 A second major project which
46. Pub. L. No. 89-519, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 2-11 (July 26, 1966).
47. FED. R. CGmn. P. 46.
48. NATIoNAL CONFEaNCE ON BAL AND C ,nInAL JUSTICE, op. cit. supra note 40,
at xiii.
49. For an extensive listing of projects similar to the Manhattan Bail Project, see
Fa= & WALD, op. cit. supra note 3, at 56-57. See also NA-TONAL CONFERENCE ON
BArL AN CGmnNAL JusTICa, op. cit. supra note 40, at xiv. In McWilliams, The Law
of Bail, 9 Camm. L.Q. 21, 34 (1966), it is reported that the Manhattan Bai Project is
the model for a similar project instituted in Toronto, Canada.
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has been undertaken by a number of jurisdictions is the so-called
"stationhouse release." This second development in the movement
to increase pre-trial release without bail has been pioneered by the
New York City Police Department in its experimental Manhattan
Summons Project. The stationhouse release is designed to avoid de-
tention on minor criminal charges by allowing the accused, when he
is brought to the precinct station, to be interviewed and his residence,
employment, family ties, and other community roots verified precisely
as in the bail program.50 This program does not eliminate arrest, but
if the accused is found to be a good risk by the interviewer, the ac-
cused is recommended to the precinct officer for release. If released,
the defendant is given a citation directing him to appear in court at
a later date.51 The program avoids unnecessary loss of liberty for the
accused, and it substantially eliminates the setting of money bail for
the defendant who has proven his reliability by appearing in response
to the summons or citation.52
V. STATE LEGISLATION
A. Current Status
Beginning in 1964, legislation encouraging the use of release with-
out bail or on nominal bail has been proposed, drafted, or passed in
Alabama, Alaska, Delaware, Florida, Illinois, Kansas, Maryland, Mich-
igan, Missouri, New Jersey, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Texas, and
Virginia.5 3 The leader in the realm of state legislative reform has been
Illinois. In 1963 the Illinois Code of Criminal Procedure4 was enacted
with an emphasis on personal recognizance rather than bail. The
judges and magistrates are instructed that the code section dealing
with pre-trial release "shall be liberally construed to effectuate the
purpose of relying upon criminal sanctions instead of financial loss
to assure the appearance of the accused."5 Many avenues have been
suggested for state legislative reform of the present bail system. One
which has received considerable attention is a "summons in lieu of
arrest." This method suggests that one accused of a minor offense
might bypass arrest and bail altogether. Instead of arrest and bail,
it is maintained that a summons or citation should be issued by a
50. NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON BAiL AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE, op. cit. supra note 40,
at xiv-xv.
51. LaFave, Alternatives to the Present Bail System, 1965 U. ILL. L.F. 8, 14-15.
52. NATIONAL CONFRNCE ON BAIL AND CRnMNAL JusTCE, op. cit. supra note 40,
at xv.
53. NA TONAL CONFEmCE ON BAL AND CRnnNAL JusmTcE, op. cit. supra note 40,
at xvi.




judge or police officer to the accused, directing him to appear in court
at a designated time for hearing or trial. Although a few states and
the federal courts have statutory provisions for judicially issued sum-
mons in lieu of warrants, or for police citations in lieu of sight arrests,
their use is presently limited to traffic offenses and violations of mu-
nicipal codes and county ordinances. Yet, in minor crimes or mis-
demeanors, estimated to constitute over ninety per cent of all Ameri-
can crimes, there appears to be little if any need to invoke the arrest
process with its consequent reliance on bail.56 The other proposed
methods of reform have been wholly or partially incorporated into the
federal Bail Reform Act of 1966. While it may appear that the reform
movement within the several states is progressing toward the accom-
plishments of the federal act, it has been pointed out that the federal
system goes beyond the present bail projects in several respects. Under
the federal system, factual inquiry is required regardless of whether a
neutral fact-finding agency exists. Release without money in the fed-
eral courts is the norm, not the exception, for the system's emphasis
shifts from release of specially qualified defendants on personal bond
to release of all defendants on conditions suited to their individual
risks. Last of all, defendants under the federal system who are not
released are entitled to a clear statement of reasons on which to base
further review.57
B. Bail Reform Act as a Model for State Legislation
It has been suggested that the Bail Reform Act of 1966 may be-
come the model for reformation of state systems of criminal justice."6
Built upon results obtained from such empirical studies as the Man-
hattan Bail Project, the Bail Reform Act has incorporated within it
the suggestions of leading legal scholars in the field. Yet there ap-
pear to be several obstacles which must be overcome before the fed-
eral act would be an appropriate model for state legislative reform.
First, the effective administration of the Bail Reform Act requires the
existence of a neutral fact-finding agency that will collect the data
needed to decide whether the accused should be released on his own
recognizance. One authority has suggested that the functions of ob-
taining, verifying, and reporting relevant information for judicial of-
ficers should ideally be carried out by law students. 9 If law students
are not available, graduate students doing work in related fields should
be used. If neither law students nor graduate students are available,
56. LaFave, supra note 51, at 13-14.
57. Wald & Freed, supra note 44, at 941.
58. Wald & Freed, supra note 44, at 940.
59. McCarthy, Practical Results of Bail Reform, 29 Fed. Prob. 10, 14 (1965).
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the work of the fact-finding agency may be a proper function of the
junior sections of local bar associations. With the cooperation of local
law firms, young attorneys could be made available on a rotating basis
to carry out the work of the agency. Both the cooperating firms and
the young lawyers would benefit from this experience, for the recent
graduates would receive valuable legal and courtroom experience.
60
A second obstacle which must be overcome before the federal act
could be adopted as a model for state legislative action would be the
need for state acceptance of the federal act's liberal exclusionary
policy. The Bail Reform Act excludes only capital crimes from its
provisions, but some present bail projects exclude all but minor crimes
and misdemeanors.61 While there is usually great public concern that
serious offenses be excluded from the act, there is strong authority
supporting the position that only capital crimes should be excluded.62
To deny an accused individual his freedom, not on the ground that
he will fail to reappear for trial, but rather on account of the serious-
ness of the charge against him, is thought by many to be inconsistent
with the philosophy that bail determinations should be tailored to the
individual defendant rather than the alleged offense.63 Furthermore,
data compiled from several bail projects indicates not only that se-
lective release of defendants in serious cases can be accomplished suc-
cessfully, but also that such released defendants as a class may be
better risks than the class of persons charged with certain lesser
crimes.6 It would seem that only by adopting a liberal exclusionary
policy, such as that incorporated in the federal act, can the desired
goals of bail reform be fully achieved. All information available at
the present time suggests that the seriousness of the alleged offense is
not a reliable indication of whether the accused will return for trial.65
The state, therefore, should find little reason to differ with the liberal
exclusionary policy of the federal Bail Reform Act.
The last and most difficult obstacle which must be overcome con-
cerns the perplexing issue of "preventive detention," i.e., the current
practice among state courts intentionally to set bail beyond the means
of a defendant believed to be dangerous, for the purpose of assuring
that he will not be released prior to trial. The issue of preventive de-
tention has brought forth considerable criticism of the Bail Reform
60. Ibid.
61. FREED & WALD, op. cit. supra note 3, at 9-21.
62. Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights and the Subcommittee
on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 89th
Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 57-58 (1965) [hereinafter cited as 1.965 Senate Hearings].
63. Id. at 58.
64. 1965 Senate Hearings 58.
65. 1965 Senate Hearings 56-59.
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Act of 1966, and it has been suggested that the absence of this element
in the federal act creates an alleged "key gap" in the law.66 This key
gap refers to the fact that judges, except in capital cases and after
conviction, cannot consider danger to the community in deciding
whether the defendant should be released pending trial. The contro-
versial issue of whether a judge should be able to consider preventive
detention in deciding upon pre-trial release received considerable at-
tention in the House Hearings Before the Subcommittee of the Com-
mittee on the Judiciary.67 The Senate was unable to reach an agree-
ment as to whether the Bail Reform Act should allow preventive de-
tention; but rather than allow the issue to impede the badly needed
bail reform, the Senate decided to omit the issue from the act and
consider it separately in more detail.68 There have been several in-
stances reported of individuals committing further criminal acts while
free on bail, at times with a grievous cost to society, 9 and public
officials and private citizens alike have expressed concern over the
great deal of freedom given to the accused under the new bail act.
"These considerations," Senator Ervin of North Carolina has stated,
have prompted many commentators on the American bail system to recom-
mend that the present laws providing an absolute right to bail in certain
cases should be discarded, that release should be optional in all cases, and
that procedures for a prompt review of bail decisions should be developed.
It is argued that the bail system, as thus modified, would not only be
more effective in protecting society from dangerous offenders who can meet
financial bail requirements or flee the jurisdiction of the court, but would
also provide a more reliable bail system for releasing persons whose com-
munity ties qualify them for release.7 0
The advantages of allowing preventive detention as an element of
a bail statute are readily apparent. Heightened public concern over
the increasing crime rate emphasizes the importance of balancing a
defendant's right to pre-trial freedom with the interest of the com-
munity in protection from threats to the physical safety of its citizens.
A bail statute which allows for preventive detention might tend to
eliminate unnecessary detention and yet make it possible to deny re-
lease altogether where monetary bail now frees dangerous persons. 1
Furthermore, spelling out standards for preventive detention would
increase its reviewability.
66. Time, Feb. 3, 1967, p. 47.
67. 1966 House Hearings 28-30, 50-52, 55-57.
68. 1966 House Hearings 19.
69. See GOLDFAn, RANsom-A C~rrQuE OF THE AMNICAN BAIL SYSTEMii 132-37
(1965). See also Time, Feb. 3, 1967, p. 47.
70. 1965 Senate Hearings 3.
71. 1965 Senate Hearings 58-59.
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On the other hand, the disadvantages of such a statute are numerous.
As pointed out by the National Bail Conference Interim Report:
It is difficult to secure agreement on standards for denying release: if
drawn narrowly, they may eliminate the discretion which is desirable in
hard cases; if drawn broadly, they may undermine the Anglo-Saxon tra-
dition which favors pre-trial release. Some judges, moreover, may be reluc-
tant to find a likelihood of future criminal conduct on the part of a defendant
who has not been convicted on the charge which brought him into custody.
Other judges may tend to detain accused persons whenever there is doubt
about their dangerousness, especially in times of heightened community
concern. A detention statute also raises problems of delayed release pend-
ing hearings on detention (in order to secure witnesses and appoint coun-
sel); of prejudicing a defendant's right to a fair trial by adducing and
giving attendant publicity to background evidence in detention hearings;
and, through requiring damaging findings as prerequisites to detention, inter-
fering with the presumption of innocence at trial and tainting the defendant's
record even if he is later acquitted on the charge which caused his arrest.
7 2
While there was considerable controversy concerning whether the
federal Bail Reform Act should allow for preventive detention, the
issue becomes even more acute when the federal act is considered as
a model for state legislative reform. In considering the new act, one
commentator has pointed out that since many federal cases involve
white-collar crimes and relatively responsible defendants, the act
should generally work very well.73 The commentator continued, how-
ever, to conclude that "the law has run onto a prickly shoal in Wash-
ington, D. C., where federal courts handle all kinds of violent big-city
crimes."74 There is indeed a great divergence between the general
nature of the crimes brought before federal and state courts. With
the exception of those sitting in the District of Columbia and terri-
tories, federal courts are far less concerned with crimes of violence
than are state courts. Thus, the issue of preventive detention is
brought into much clearer perspective when it is realized that a state
bail reform statute would deal with the most dangerous of criminals
as well as innocent or minor offenders of the law. Should not a state
judge or committing magistrate be allowed to consider the risk cre-
ated to the community before releasing a dangerous criminal, even
though he may feel sure that the accused will return for trial?
If a preventive detention provision were to be incorporated within
a state bail statute, however, serious constitutional problems would
arise 5 Since most states guarantee a right to bail either by consti-
72. 1965 Senate Hearings 59.
73. Time, Feb. 3, 1967, p. 47.
74. Time, Feb. 3, 1967, p. 47.




tutional provision or by statute, it would be necessary to eradicate
these provisions either by constitutional amendment or by legislative
action. Furthermore, a substantial body of opinion supports the view
that preventive detention is contrary to the eighth amendment and
thereby unconstitutional under the federal constitution.76 It seems
probable, therefore, that an extensive revision of existing law and
judicial policy would be required before either a state or a federal
statute could contain a preventive detention provision. Yet, if judges
and committing magistrates continue to employ the device of pre-
ventive detention, it should be codified in legislation rather than con-
tinued under the false pretense of detention to assure the defendant's
presence at trial."7 If, on the other hand, preventive detention is ex-
cluded from state bail statutes, the security of society may well be
jeopardized. Since the federal Bail Reform Act applies to all courts
of Washington, D.C., statistics should soon be available to determine if
pre-trial release can be successfully administered without considering
preventive detention. Washington, D.C., will probably become the
proving ground for the Bail Reform Act of 1966, and should, in the
last analysis, determine whether the act will be a suitable model for
state legislative reform.
VI. CONCLUSION
The bail system in America has lost the purpose which it was
designed to serve; and the constitutional provision of the eighth
amendment that bail "shall not be excessive" has been ignored for
almost two centuries. While the bail system has exacted an incal-
culable toll of human costs, it has wasted millions in the useless and
needless detention of innocent individuals; and has discriminated
against the poor in favor of the wealthy and influential. There is
today a strong movement of reform and a new awareness of the in-
justice which the bail system perpetuates. The federal Bail Reform
Act of 1966 was designed to eliminate this injustice, and while it has
been criticized because it does not allow for preventive detention, it
has been heralded as a major accomplishment in the field of criminal
justice. Whether the Bail Reform Act of 1966 is an appropriate model
for state legislative reform is a question difficult, if not impossible to
answer at the present time. With the data which should soon be
forthcoming from the operation of the Bail Reform Act in Washington,
D.C., bail authorities will be better equipped to decide whether pre-
trial release can be safely effectuated without consideration of pre-
ventive detention.
76. 1965 Senate Hearings 58.
77. Paulsen, supra note 75, at 125.
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